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The Final Frontier: Are Class Action Waivers in Broker-Dealer
Employment Agreements Enforceable?
Jill I. Gross*

I. INTRODUCTION
Many broker-dealers (securities brokerage firms)1 require their
employees, also known as “associated persons,”2 to sign employment
agreements as a condition of employment. Often those employment
agreements include a provision mandating arbitration of any employment
disputes that may arise.3 Under the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation
of section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),4 there is little doubt that
*

Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law
at Pace University. I am grateful to comments I received at the February 12, 2020, Penn State
Arbitration Law Review Symposium, “Collective Bargaining and Adhesive Arbitration.” I
also am grateful for the research assistance of Diana Balaj, Haub Law, J.D. Class of 2022.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) defines “broker” as “any person
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.”
Exchange Act, § 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2018). The Exchange Act defines a "dealer"
as “any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account,
through a broker or otherwise....” Exchange Act, § 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5). Since most
industry firms act as both brokers and dealers, they are commonly referred to as “brokerdealers.”
1

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), the primary self-regulatory
organization (“SRO”) in the securities industry, designates individual brokers employed or
controlled by a broker-dealer firm as “associated persons.” FINRA MANUAL, Rule 1011(b),
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules (last visited July 2, 2020).
2

3

See JAMES A. FANTO, JILL GROSS & NORMAN POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND
REGULATION § 21.01, at 21-3 (5th ed. 2018 & supp. 2020). Even absent an arbitration clause
in an employment agreement, employment disputes between an associated person and a
FINRA member firm must be arbitrated under FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for
Industry Disputes (“Industry Code”), Rule 13200(a).
4

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). That section provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such
a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
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those adhesive pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate are enforceable, even for
claims arising under federal statutes.5
Some of these employment contracts also include within the pre-dispute
arbitration agreement additional language known as a “class action waiver.”6
Pursuant to a typical class action waiver clause, parties agree not only to
arbitrate all disputes arising out of the contractual relationship, but, as part of
that agreement, they agree to waive their right to bring those claims on a
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
The Court has written that section 2 reflects “an emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral
dispute resolution” (Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 533 (2012)
(quoting KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 565 U.S. 18, 21 (2011) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
omitted)) and a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.” Moses H. Cone
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). Thus, through section 2, Congress
expressed a policy preference for both the process of arbitration and the contract to use the
process (the arbitration agreement).
5

See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018) (reiterating that the FAA
“requires courts ‘rigorously’ to ‘enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms’”);
see also 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009) (holding that “collectivebargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate
ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law”); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (holding that claims arising under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act are arbitrable). Additionally, in December 2019, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission rescinded its 1997 policy statement that opposed mandatory
arbitration of employment discrimination claims. See Equal Opportunity Empl. Comm.,
RECISSION OF MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
DISPUTES AS A CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT, https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/recissionmandatory-binding-arbitration-employment-discrimination-disputes-condition (last visited
June 29, 2020).
6

For example, as a condition of their employment with the company, Credit Suisse requires
its financial advisers to agree to an arbitration agreement within a document called the
Employment Dispute Resolution Program (“EDRP”). The EDRP specifies individual
binding arbitration as the only procedure for resolving disputes that cannot be resolved by
agreement, and states that “no dispute subject to arbitration under this section shall be
consolidated with any other employee’s dispute or prosecuted as a class or collective
action…An employee’s agreement to abide by the terms of the [EDRP] includes an
agreement not to serve as a class representative or class member or act as a private attorney
general in any dispute with Credit Suisse.” See Laver v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA), LLC, No.
18-CV-00828-WHO, 2018 WL 3068109, at *7-10 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2018), aff’d, 976 F.3d
841 (9th Cir. 2020). Other broker-dealers that have included class action waivers in their
employment agreements include UBS Financial Services, Ameriprise Financial Services,
and Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. See Lewis v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., 818 F. Supp. 2d 1161,
1166 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (enforcing class waiver); Dauod v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., No.
8:10-CV-00302-CJC, 2011 WL 6961586, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2011); Banus v. Citigroup
Glob. Markets, Inc., No. 09 CIV. 7128 (LAK), 2010 WL 1643780, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23,
2010), aff'd, 422 F. App'x 53 (2d Cir. 2011).
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representative basis, including as a member of a class or collective action.
Instead, parties agree that any covered dispute would have to be brought
individually in arbitration.7 The Court enforces these waivers as an agreedupon term in the arbitration clause specifying “the rules under which that
arbitration will be conducted.”8
To date, the Supreme Court has not seen a class action waiver it has not
liked or enforced.9 In 2011, it held that the FAA preempted a California
judge-made law that voided consumer class action waivers as unconscionable
because that state law conflicted with the purposes of the FAA. Rather, the
FAA mandated enforcement of the waiver. 10 In 2013, the Court ruled that a
class action waiver in merchants’ arbitration agreements with their charge
card service provider does not deprive them of their ability to vindicate their
statutory rights, even if the expense of pursuing an antitrust claim on an
individual basis made it economically unfeasible to pursue.11 Only if an
7

See, e.g., Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 231 (2013) (identifying class
action waiver language in the arbitration agreement at issue).
8

Id. at 233, 238-39; see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011)
(enforcing class action waiver). Notably, the Italian Colors Court treated the class action
waiver provision as a term of the arbitration agreement, not a separate agreement between
the parties. Indeed, if the Court were to treat the two provisions as separate agreements, then
FAA section 2 would not cover the class waiver provision at all, as it would not be an
“agreement to arbitrate.”
9

See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018) (enforcing class action waiver
in employment agreement); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 466 (2015)
(preempting under the FAA a California state court’s holding that a class action waiver in an
arbitration clause was not enforceable under California law); Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 23335 (enforcing pre-dispute arbitration clause containing a class action waiver in merchants’
credit card processing agreements); AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 352 (holding that FAA
preempted California law invalidating class action waivers in consumer agreements). On a
related note, the Court recently held that the FAA does not allow a court to compel class
arbitration when the agreement does not clearly provide for it. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela,
139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2019) (“Like silence, ambiguity does not provide a sufficient basis to
conclude that parties to an arbitration agreement agreed to [class arbitration]”).
10

AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 352. The Court discussed three characteristics of class
arbitration that it concluded defeat the purposes of the FAA and hinder the flexible partydriven process of arbitration: (1) sacrifice of informality and speed; (2) a requisite increase
in procedural formality; and (3) an increase in risks to defendants in the lack of judicial
review. Id. at 348-51.
Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 234-35. The “effective vindication” doctrine originated from
dictum in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628,
(1985), where the Court “expressed a willingness to invalidate, on ‘public policy’ grounds,
11
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arbitration agreement stripped a party of the “right” to sue, as opposed to the
“ability” to sue would it be unenforceable.12 In 2018, the Court ruled that a
class and collective action waiver in an employment agreement was
enforceable, and that the National Labor Relations Act’s language granting
workers the right to form unions and bargain collectively was not a “contrary
congressional command” that superseded the FAA’s command to enforce
arbitration agreements as written and voided the waiver.13
What about in the securities industry? Neither FINRA’s Industry Code
nor Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes (“Customer
Code”)14 permits class or collective claims to be pursued in its forum.15 This
policy choice is based on a conclusion by the forum and by FINRA’s direct
regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), that FINRA’s
arbitration forum is not appropriate to handle and resolve class actions.16
Instead, securities regulators have made it clear that investors and associated
persons should have the right to bring class actions in court.17
Indeed, in a disciplinary proceeding, FINRA’s Board of Governors
reversed a hearing officer's ruling that a broker-dealer could insert a class
action waiver in its standard customer arbitration agreement, and any FINRA
arbitration agreements that ‘operat [e] ... as a prospective waiver of a party's right to
pursue statutory remedies.’” Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 235 (citing Mitsubishi Motors, 473
U.S. at 637, n. 19 (emphasis added)).
12

Italian Colors, 570 U.S., at 236. Though the Court wrote in Italian Colors that it has
enforced a class action waiver before (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20 (1991), as an example), in fact, no class action waiver was at issue in Gilmer. See
Jill I. Gross, Justice Scalia's Hat Trick and the Supreme Court’s Flawed Understanding of
Twenty-First Century Arbitration, 81 BROOKLYN L. REV. 111, 134-36 (2015).
13

Epic Systems, 138 S.Ct. at 1624-26. Though the Court has not had an opportunity to
address the enforeceability of a class action waiver in an arbitration clause arising out of a
collective bargaining agreement, it is likely that the Court would find that enforceable, too.
However, a union is unlikely to agree to include a class action waiver in a collective
bargaining agreement, so the issue may never be ripe for Supreme Court review. See Lise
Gelertner, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 116.
14

FINRA Dispute Resolution Services hears 99% of all securities arbitrations in the country.
Arbitration
&
Mediation,
FIN.
INDUS.
REGULATORY
AUTH.,
https://www.finra.org/arbitration-mediation (last visited June 27, 2020). It offers separate
Codes of Arbitration Procedure for disputes between customers and broker-dealers on the
one hand, and intra-industry disputes on the other.
15

FINRA Rules 12204, 13204.

16

See infra notes 36-42, and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 43-48, and accompanying text.
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rules to the contrary are preempted by the FAA.18 Instead, FINRA held that
FINRA's rules mandating that investors be able to bring class claims in court
were enforceable.19 FINRA’s regulatory policy, however, clashes with the
FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration agreements as written, if a brokerdealer inserts a class waiver in its employment agreements with associated
persons.
How would a court resolve a broker-dealer’s action to enforce its class
action waiver, which would require the court to disregard FINRA Rule
13204? The Supreme Court has identified one exception to the FAA’s
mandate: if a “contrary congressional command” displaces the FAA.20 Thus
far, the Court has not had occasion to examine whether a class action waiver
in a broker-dealer’s employment agreement with an employee is enforceable
under this exception. While the Court seems very supportive of these waivers,
the securities industry is different.21 Securities arbitration is heavily
regulated, and pronouncements by the SEC—when exercising power
expressly delegated to it by Congress— make it clear that class actions in
court should be preserved for both investors and broker-dealer employees.
This article analyzes this issue and concludes that these class waivers are
not enforceable. Part II details the regulatory framework in the securities
industry relevant to this issue. Part III explains why FINRA, as a forum, does
not accept class actions and why the SEC believes court-filed class actions
should be preserved for employees of broker-dealers. Part IV describes the
framework the Supreme Court directs courts to use when analyzing alleged
conflicts between two Congressional Acts. Part V argues that FINRA’s Rule
13204 barring FINRA member firms from forcing employees to waive their
right to pursue class action claims in court conflicts with and supersedes the
FAA’s general pronouncement to enforce arbitration agreements as written.
Part VI concludes.

18

See Dep't of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Complaint No. 2011029760201,
2014 WL 1665738 (FINRA Apr. 24, 2014).
19

Id. at *14-18. Simultaneous with the issuance of the decision, Schwab entered into a Letter
of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent with FINRA, settling the enforcement action by
consenting to a $500,000 penalty and agreeing not to appeal the decision further.
20

CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012) (holding that claims arising
under federal statutes are arbitrable as a matter of public policy absent a “contrary
congressional command”) (quoting Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
226 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
21

See Jill Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, 30 PACE L. REV. 1174 (2010)
(arguing that the regulatory scheme in the securities industry differentiates arbitration
agreements in broker-dealer customer agreements from those in consumer contracts).
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II. CONGRESS’ STATUTORY DELEGATION TO THE SEC
In the wake of the stock market crash of 1929, Congress passed the
Exchange Act in 193422 to protect investors from abuses in the capital
markets.23 In addition to creating the SEC as the primary federal securities
regulator, the Exchange Act also set up a system of industry self-regulation
designating national securities exchanges as SROs to further protect investors
and the public interest.24
In 1938, Congress amended the Exchange Act to authorize the
registration of national securities associations as additional SROs to regulate
brokers in the over-the-counter market.25 Additionally, Congress required all
broker-dealers that deal with the public (with a few minor exceptions) to be
a member of a registered national securities association.26 Because FINRA is
the only registered national securities association under section 15A of the
Exchange Act, all broker-dealers are FINRA member firms.27
In 1975, Congress again amended the Exchange Act, this time to give the
SEC broad new powers over all SROs, including the power to review and
approve all of their proposed rules and to require them to adopt, change, or
repeal any rules if deemed necessary.28 Through this power, the SEC
exercises oversight of FINRA’s activities, including operation of its
arbitration forum. The Exchange Act requires FINRA to adopt rules that may
be designed for a variety of purposes, ranging from preventing “fraudulent
and manipulative acts and practices” to promoting “just and equitable
principles of trade,” and “in general, [protecting] investors and the public
22

Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–
78pp (2018)).
23

See JAMES A. FANTO, JILL GROSS & NORMAN POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND
REGULATION § 1.01, at 1-3 (5th ed. 2018 & Supp. 2020) (explaining that the broker-dealer
“industry is highly regulated because of its economic importance” and the “possibility of
investor abuse”).
24

See id. § 4.01, at 4-3, 4-4.

25

See id. § 4.01[C], at 4-9.

26

See Exchange Act § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8).

27

See Exchange Act § 15(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(1).

28

Exchange Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s. Specifically, Congress mandated that the SEC review
and release for public comment “any proposed rule or any proposed change in, addition to,
or deletion from the rules of such self-regulatory organization.” See Exchange Act § 19(b)(1),
15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1); see also FANTO, GROSS & POSER, supra note 23, § 4.01[D] at 4-11.
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interest.”29 FINRA must file proposed rule changes with the SEC, and, before
approving them, the SEC must publish notice and provide interested persons
an opportunity to comment on the proposals.30
Like it has in other industries,31 in the securities industry Congress created
an administrative agency—the SEC—and empowered it to be the expert
decision-maker regarding regulation in the securities industry. Indeed, as
recently as 2010, in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010,32 Congress reaffirmed the long-held view that
regulation of arbitration in the securities industry was best left to the SEC—
the administrative agency with the most relevant expertise and a long history
of regulating the process, rather than Congress itself.33 The next section
discusses how the SEC invoked its expertise and implemented the policies of
the Exchange Act and purposes of Congress when regulating FINRA’s
arbitration forum.
III. FINRA DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND CLASS ACTIONS
The securities industry has used arbitration to resolve intra-industry
disputes since the founding of the New York Stock Exchange in the early
1800s.34 FINRA and its predecessor, the National Association of Securities
29

Exchange Act § 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6). The statute also lists certain improper
purposes, including regulating “matters not related to the purposes of [the Act].” Id.
30

Id. § 19(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1). Conversely, the SEC must disapprove a proposed
rule change if it does not make the requisite finding. Id. § 19(b)(2)(C)(ii), 15 U.S.C. §
78s(b)(2)(C)(ii). In addition, the SEC may, on its own initiative, amend FINRA’s rules as it
deems “necessary or appropriate . . . in furtherance of the purposes of [the Exchange Act].”
Id. § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c).
31

For example, in 2010 in the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress created the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) within the Federal Reserve System as an “independent
regulatory agency tasked with ensuring that consumer debt products are safe and
transparent.” Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2191 (2020);
12 U. S. C. § 5511(a). Congress created the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970 “to
consolidate the major environmental responsibilities of the federal government.” The
Environmental Protection Agency, 5 West's Fed. Admin. Prac. § 5223.
32

Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (“Dodd-Frank”).

33

See Dodd-Frank § 921(a) (empowering the SEC to prohibit mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in customer agreements).
34

See Jill I. Gross, The Historical Basis of Securities Arbitration as an Investor Protection
Mechanism, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 171, 175-76 (describing history of development of the

102

Dealers (“NASD”) has been running a dispute resolution forum for
arbitration and mediation of both customer and intra-industry disputes since
1968.35
A. FINRA Rule 13204
Since 1992, FINRA, as a policy matter, has banned class action
arbitration proceedings in its forum. Both Rule 12204(a) of the Customer
Code and Rule 13204(a) of the Industry Code state: “(1) Class action claims
may not be arbitrated under [FINRA Rules].”36 Additionally, subsection
(a)(4) of the rules provide:
A member or associated person may not enforce any
arbitration agreement against a member of a certified or
putative class action with respect to any claim that is the
subject of the certified or putative class action until:
•
•
•
•

The class certification is denied;
The class is decertified;
The member of the certified or putative class is
excluded from the class by the court; or
The member of the certified or putative class elects not
to participate in the class or withdraws from the class
according to conditions set by the court, if any.37

SRO arbitration forum for the securities industry).
35

Id. at 181.

36

FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12204(a); FINRA Code
of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes R. 13204(a); see also Lloyd v. J.P. Morgan
Chase & Co., 791 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Rule 13204 prevents FINRA arbitrators
from entertaining class and collective action claims”). However, FINRA recognizes that
claimants may benefit by combining similar claims to achieve efficiencies and cost-savings.
Thus, it permits joinder of claims if: (1) “the claims contain common questions of law or
fact, and (2) the claims assert any right to relief jointly and severally, or the claims arise out
of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” FINRA Code
of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12312(a); FINRA Code of Arbitration
Procedure for Industry Disputes R. 13312(a).
37

FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes R. 13204(a)(4). Prior to 1992,
there were no express protections against member firms enforcing pre-dispute agreements to
compel arbitration of class or putative class claims. Specifically, the SEC’s notice of the
proposed new NASD rule stated that it was being proposed by the NASD following a request
by former SEC Chairman Ruder for NASD and other SROs to “consider adopting procedures
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Rule 13204(b) proscribes the same limitations with respect to collective
actions.38 Thus, the rule explicitly bars member firms from enforcing any
arbitration agreement against an associated person (i.e., an employee) with
respect to any class or collective action claim unless and until one of the four
conditions are satisfied. Because a class waiver is one term of an arbitration
agreement, the rule bars member firms from enforcing class waivers unless
and until one of the four conditions are satisfied.
The SEC’s order approving the predecessor to Rule 12204, NASD Rule
10301,39 emphasized that the Commission made a policy choice that class
actions did not belong in SRO arbitration:
[T]he NASD believes, and the Commission agrees, that the
judicial system has already developed the procedures to
manage class action claims. Entertaining such claims through
arbitration at the NASD would be difficult, duplicative and
wasteful.…The Commission agrees with the NASD’s position
that, in all cases, class actions are better handled by the courts
and that investors should have access to the courts to resolve
class actions efficiently.40
that would give investors access to the courts in appropriate cases, including class actions.”
See Proposed Rule Change by Nat’l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc. re Improvements in NASD
Code of Arbitration Proc., 57 Fed. Reg. 30519-01, 30520 (July 1, 1992).
38

FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes R. 13204(b).

39

In 2007, NASD Rule 10301, as it related to employees, was administratively replaced by
the substantively similar FINRA Rule 13204 following the merger of NASD and NYSE
Regulation, Inc. to form FINRA. FINRA Regulatory Notice 07-07, Code of Arbitration
Procedure (Apr. 16, 2007). As part of that code consolidation project, FINRA added one
sentence to the end of new FINRA Rule 13204: “These subparagraphs do not otherwise
affect the enforceability of any rights under the Code or any other agreement.” This sentence
updated language in old NASD Rule 10301 that stated: “No member or associated person
shall be deemed to have waived any of its rights under this Code or under any agreement to
arbitrate to which it is party except to the extent stated in this paragraph.” Reorganization
and Revision of NASD Arbitration Rules Relating to Industry Disputes, SR-NASD-2004011, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rule-filings/sr-nasd-2004-011. FINRA has
explained that “any other agreement” means an agreement other than the predispute
arbitration agreement with a customer. Schwab, 2014 WL 1665738 at *22 n.11. If a class
waiver clause is part of the arbitration agreement, then this sentence does not indicate that a
class waiver is enforceable as “any other agreement.”
40
Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc,;
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Exclusion of Class Action Claims
from Arbitration, 57 Fed. Reg. 52659, 52660 (Nov. 4, 1992).
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Thus, the SEC determined that courts were the preferable forum for class
claims, because, unlike the SRO arbitration forums, courts already had in
place procedures to manage those claims.41 In approving the rule, the SEC
recognized that class actions were important for investor protection and
reflected an efficient allocation of resources between two dispute resolution
systems.42 Moreover, the rule addressed the SEC’s concern that investors
should have access to the courts in appropriate cases, including for class
actions.43
Two years later, in 1994, the SEC approved an amendment to NASD Rule
10301 to clarify that the rule was intended to cover employment-related class
actions involving member firms and their employees, and not just customer
class actions.44 Notably, in approving this clarifying change, the SEC
reiterated the rule’s fundamental purpose of protecting member firms’
customers and employees’ rights to bring and participate in class actions:
“[The SEC] believes that access to the courts for class action litigation should
be preserved for associated persons and member firms as well as for investors
and that the rule change approved herein provides a sound procedure for the
management of class actions.”45
In 2012, the SEC approved an amendment to FINRA Rule 13204 (former
“The NASD believes that the proposed rule change … will facilitate the arbitration process
for all participants by preventing certain categories of actions from being brought in the
NASD's arbitration forum and for which the forum does not have procedures or resources to
handle.” Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Exclusion of Class Action
Claims from Arbitration, Release No. 33506, 1994 WL 28348, at *2 (Jan. 24, 1993).
41

42

Id. For a more complete history of the rule, see Barbara Black and Jill I. Gross, Investor
Protection Meets the Federal Arbitration Act, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1, 27-28 (2012).
43

Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.;
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions From
Arbitration Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg. 52659-02, at 52660; see also Dep’t of Enforcement v.
Charles Schwab & Co., No. 2011029760201, 2014 WL 1665738, *11 (FINRA Bd. of
Governors Apr. 24, 2014) (“Rule 12204 of the Customer Code was intended to preserve
investor access to the courts to bring or participate in judicial class actions”).
44

Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc,;
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Exclusion of Class Action Claims
from Arbitration, 59 Fed. Reg. 22032-01, at 22033 (explaining that the “original intent of the
[1992 rule] was to exclude class action claims by associated persons, including employmentrelated claims, and other industry class actions from arbitration, as well as customer-related
class actions.”).
45
Id. (emphasis added).
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NASD Rule 10301), creating new subsection (b) to expand the Rule’s
prohibition to “collective action claims by employees of FINRA members
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), or the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (APA).”46 In its
approval order, the SEC reiterated that one of the fundamental purposes of
Rule 13204 is to protect member firms’ employees’ rights to bring and
participate in class and collective actions in court.47 The SEC specifically
based its approval on, inter alia, its findings that the amendment would:
(a) “facilitate the efficient resolution of collective actions under the FLSA,
ADEA, or the EPA, as courts have established procedures to manage these
types of representative actions;” and (b) “preserve access to courts for these
types of claims for employees of FINRA members.”48
In summary, while there have been a few amendments to the language of
Rules 12204 and 13204 over the years, the basic restrictions of the current
version are materially the same as those of the original rule the SEC approved
back in 1992—member firms may not enforce pre-dispute arbitration
agreements with respect to class or putative class claims, subject to four listed
exceptions addressing situations such as where class certification has been
denied or where an absent class member has affirmatively opted out of a class
pursuant to Rule 23 or similar state procedures.
B. FINRA Rule 12204 Bars Class Action Waivers in Customer
Agreements
FINRA Rule 12204(d)—worded substantially similar to Rule
13204(a)(4)—is the counterpart to Rule 13204 in the customer context.
46

Self-Regulatory Organizations; Financial Industry Regulatory Authoritym Inc.; Notice of
filing Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule
Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 1, Amending Rule 13204 of the Code of Arbitration
Procedure for Industry Disputes to Preclude Collective Action Claims From Being
Arbitrated, 77 Fed. Reg. 22374 (Apr. 13, 2012).
47

Id. at 22375. During the comment period, Assistant Chief Counsel of FINRA Dispute
Resolution, Mignon McLemore, noted in a letter to the SEC that “any language in a member
firm’s employment agreement that requires employees to waive their right to file or
participate in a collective action against a member firm in other fora is contrary to the
provisions of the Industry Code. A member firm's use of such language that limits
employees’ rights, and contradicts Rule 13204(b), would violate IM-13000, and may also
violate FINRA Rule 2010.” Letter from Mignon McLemore, Assistant Chief Counsel,
FINRA Dispute Resolution, to Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission,
Apr.
13,
2012,
https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-finra-2011075/finra2011075-4.pdf (last visited July 3, 2020).
48

SEC Order re Amending Rule 13204, 77 Fed. Reg. at 22375.
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Significantly, FINRA has interpreted Rule 12204(d) to bar class action
waivers in arbitration agreements between broker-dealers and their
customers. In 2014, in an enforcement action against FINRA member Charles
Schwab, the FINRA Board of Governors ruled that Schwab’s inclusion of a
class waiver provision in its customer arbitration agreement violated FINRA
Rule 12204(d).49
IV. THE “CONTRARY
EXCEPTION TO THE FAA

CONGRESSIONAL

COMMAND”

As stated above, under the FAA, courts must enforce arbitration
agreements as written.50 However, the Court has declared repeatedly that the
FAA’s mandate is not absolute: it “may be overridden by a contrary
Congressional command.”51 Indeed, in any statutory context, when
inconsistent laws emanate from a single legislature, absent an express
exemption clause in either, the Supreme Court reconciles them by applying
the long-standing canon of statutory construction known as the implied repeal
doctrine.52 Limited to narrow circumstances,53 the doctrine applies only to
the extent necessary to reconcile the conflicting laws.54 The burden is on the
party seeking the implied repeal to show congressional intent to override the
former law, which can be proven through (1) the text of the law, (2) its
legislative history, or (3) an inherent conflict between the edict of the former
law and the underlying purpose of the latter.55
Dep’t of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., No. 2011029760201, 2014 WL 1665738
(FINRA Bd. of Governors Apr. 24, 2014).
49

50

See supra notes 4-5, and accompanying text.

51

Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987); see also CompuCredit
Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012).
52

For a more thorough description of the implied repeal doctrine, see Black and Gross, supra
note 42, at 32-35.
See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 734 (1975) (implied
repeal limited to “particular and discrete instances” where an appeal was “necessary to make
the [regulatory scheme] work”) (alteration in original) (quoting Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch.,
373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)).
53

54

See Silver, 373 U.S. at 357; Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003).
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27 (analyzing alleged conflict between FAA and the antiwaiver section of the Exchange Act); see also Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing,
551 U.S. 264, 275-77 (2007) (identifying factors to consider when choosing between
conflicting federal laws to assess whether they are truly incompatible).
55
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The Supreme Court recently considered the implied repeal doctrine when
analyzing an alleged conflict between the FAA and another Congressional
statute.56 In Epic Systems, employees alleged various labor and law violations
by their employers in class actions filed in federal district court. The
employers sought to compel arbitration pursuant to a pre-dispute arbitration
clause and class action waiver in the applicable employment agreements. The
employees argued that the National Labor Relations Act’s (“NLRA”)
protection of “concerted activities”57 included an employee’s right to pursue
labor claims as a class or collective action and thus displaced the FAA’s
mandate to enforce arbitration agreements as written.
The Court rejected plaintiffs’ contention that section 7 of the NLRA
conflicts with section 2 of the FAA:
When confronted with two Acts of Congress allegedly touching on
the same topic, this Court is not at “liberty to pick and choose among
congressional enactments” and must instead strive “‘to give effect to
both.’” A party seeking to suggest that two statutes cannot be harmonized,
and that one displaces the other, bears the heavy burden of showing “‘a
clearly expressed congressional intention’” that such a result should
follow. The intention must be “‘clear and manifest.’” And in approaching
a claimed conflict, we come armed with the “stron[g] presum[ption]” that
repeals by implication are “disfavored” and that “Congress will
specifically address” preexisting law when it wishes to suspend its normal
operations in a later statute.58
The Court held that Section 7 of the NLRA is not a “contrary”
pronouncement by Congress that supplanted the FAA because it does not
express approval or disapproval of arbitration or mention class procedures.59
Rather, section 7 speaks only about workers’ concerted activities such as
collective bargaining, picketing and strikes. Indeed, the Court stated “that the
absence of any specific statutory discussion of arbitration or class actions is
56

Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624-30 (2018) (identifying criteria for
application of implied repeal doctrine).
57

29 U. S. C. §157.

58

Epic Sys. Corp.,138 S. Ct. at 1624 (internal citations omitted).

Id. at 1624. The Court declined to give deference to the National Labor Relations Board’s
interpretation of the NLRA that it voided class action waivers because the Court did not
agree with the proposition that “Congress implicitly delegated to an agency authority to
address the meaning of a second statute it does not administer.” Id. at 1629.
59
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an important and telling clue that Congress has not displaced the Arbitration
Act.”60
Very few courts have examined whether FINRA Rule 13204 bars brokerdealers from enforcing class action waivers in their agreements with
employees under the implied repeal doctrine.61 One circuit court decision on
point is Cohen v. UBS Financial Services, Inc.62 In Cohen, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals enforced a class action waiver in an employment agreement
between Cohen, a FINRA “associated person,” and UBS Securities (“UBS”),
a broker-dealer. Cohen had filed a putative class and collective action against
UBS, asserting wage-and-hour claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and California law. UBS moved to compel individual arbitration, invoking
an arbitration clause and class and collective action waiver in the parties’
employment agreement.63
Cohen argued that FINRA Rule 13204 barred the enforcement of the class
action waiver, because it was a “contrary congressional command” that
superseded the FAA.64 Cohen contended that Rule 13204 prohibited brokerdealers from forcing employees to waive their rights to bring a collective or
class action, contrary to the FAA’s general pronouncement to enforce
arbitration agreements as written.65 The Second Circuit rejected that
argument, finding no conflict between the Rule and the FAA. Rather, the
Second Circuit concluded that Rule 13204 “does not preserve the right to
assert a claim in class or collective form notwithstanding a contractual
waiver.”66 The Court wrote:
Cohen conflates an agreement to arbitrate with a waiver of the right to
assert claims in class or collective form. Subsections (a)(4) and (b)(4) [of
Rule 13204] bar the enforcement of arbitration agreements under certain
circumstances; but neither subsection has anything to say about the
60

Id. at 1627.

61

One court of appeals held that an arbitrator should resolve the conflict between a class
waiver in an employment agreement and Rule 13204. See Hendricks v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc.,
546 F. App'x 514, 519 (5th Cir. 2013) (“we leave for the FINRA arbitration panel to decide
whether the class waiver requires the Plaintiffs to arbitrate on an individual basis”).
62

799 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2015).

63

Id. at 175.

64

Id.

65

Id. at 178.
Id.

66
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enforceability of the waivers. Although such waivers are often found in
arbitration agreements (and are so incorporated in this case), the two
contract terms are conceptually distinct. A class or collective action
waiver is a promise to forgo certain procedural mechanisms in court. An
agreement to arbitrate, on the other hand, is a promise to have a dispute
heard in some forum other than a court. Rule 13204 restricts the latter,
but not the former. As the FINRA Board of Governors has observed,
“there are no restrictions upon firms regarding the content of predispute
arbitration agreements with employees.”67
In sum, the Second Circuit concluded that Rule 13204 is not
“contrary” to the FAA because “it does not prohibit a pre-dispute waiver of
class and collective action procedures, and permits FINRA arbitration of
individual wage-and-hour claims.”68 Absent any conflict, the court reasoned,
both rules can co-exist, and the court need not even reach the issue of whether
Rule 13204 is a “congressional command.69
One year after Cohen, FINRA publicly and forcefully indicated it did
not agree with Cohen’s interpretation of FINRA rules. In Regulatory Notice
16-25, FINRA stated that the language from Schwab that the Cohen court
cited was “dicta” as well as “superseded” by the Notice.70
As detailed in Part V below, like FINRA, this author believes that
Cohen and Laver were wrongly decided.
67

Id. at 179–80 (citing In re Dep't of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., No.
2011029760201, 2014 WL 1665738, at *8 (FINRA Bd. of Governors Apr. 24, 2014)).
68

Cohen, 799 F.3d at 178.

69

Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals very recently agreed with the ruling in Cohen. See
Laver v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA), LLC, 976 F.3d 841, 847 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that Rule
13204 is not contrary to Credit Suisse’s arbitration agreement because it does not ban class
action waivers “with the clarity necessary” to displace the FAA and thus enforcing class
action waiver in brokers’ employment contracts).
70

FINRA Regulatory Notice 16-25, Forum Selection Provisions Involving Customers,
Associated Persons and Member Firms, 2016 WL 4060371, at *6 n.23 (July 2016). Courts
are divided as to whether Regulatory Notice 16-25 prohibits courts from enforcing waivers
of the right to arbitration under FINRA Rules in broker-dealer agreements. Compare
New York Bay Capital, LLC v. Cobalt Holdings, Inc., No. 1:19-CV-3618-GHW, 2020 WL
1989485, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2020) (holding that Regulatory Notice 16-25 does not
change the law that a forum selection clause supersedes FINRA Rule 12200); Binkele v.
Ausloos, No. 219CV01079APGVCF, 2019 WL 7597041, at *2 n.1 (D. Nev. July 16, 2019)
(“FINRA has no authority over federal courts in this regard”) with Reading Health Sys. v.
Bear Stearns & Co. 900 F. 3d 87 (3d Cir 2018) (citing Regulatory Notice 16-25 to support
its conclusion that forum selection clause did not supersede FINRA Rule 12200).
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V. THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, THROUGH
FINRA RULE 13204, DISPLACES THE FAA
This section argues that courts cannot enforce a class waiver in an
employee’s arbitration agreement with a FINRA member firm (a brokerdealer) because FINRA Rule 13204 (approved by the SEC through its
Congressionally-delegated authority) is a “contrary congressional command”
that displaces the FAA’s command to enforce arbitration agreements as
written.
A. Rule 13204 is “Contrary” to FAA section 2
Rule 13204 bars class/collective actions from FINRA’s arbitration
forum.71 Rule 13204 also bars broker-dealers from enforcing a class waiver
in their employment agreements. Indeed, they would face disciplinary action
if they did so.72
Therefore, Rule 13204 conflicts with the FAA because a court cannot
simultaneously respect the Rule’s prohibition on class action waivers in
broker-dealers’ arbitration agreements with their employees and the FAA’s
mandate to enforce arbitration agreements as written. Any other reading
would subvert the Rule’s purpose by enforcing class waiver provisions that
are within the very arbitration clauses that the Rule’s express language render
unenforceable in this context. Moreover, the “legislative” history of Rule
13204(a)(4) makes clear that the Rule was designed to protect and preserve
FINRA member firm employees’ access to the courts for putative class
actions against their member employees.73
Unlike Section 7 of the NLRA at issue in Epic Systems, the FINRA rule
at issue—adopted in 1992—explicitly addresses arbitration for disputes
between FINRA member firms and their associated persons, and it also
explicitly addresses class procedures. Moreover, several of FINRA’s findings
in Schwab are pertinent to the interpretation of Rule 13204(a)(4). In
particular, the Board of Governors wrote:
71

Courts grant the SEC deference in determining the meaning of SRO rules. Milliner v. Mut.
Sec., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
FINRA IM 13000 (“[i]t may be deemed conduct inconsistent with just and equitable
principles of trade and a violation of Rule 2010 for a member to require an associated person
to waive the arbitration of disputes contrary to the provisions of the Code of Arbitration
Procedure…”).
72

73

See supra notes 43-48, and accompanying text.

111

Rule 12204(d) of the Customer Code by its terms prevents a firm from
enforcing a predispute arbitration agreement until a court disposes of the
class action allegations or the customer opts out of the putative or certified
class. Thus, none of the exceptions listed in subsection (d) apply until a
customer is given the opportunity to participate in a class action. It
therefore stands to reason that Rule 12204 of the Customer Code does
not contemplate a prospective waiver of a customer’s right to participate
in a class action.”74
The Schwab reasoning that Rule 12204 prohibits class action waivers in
broker-dealer/customer arbitration agreements applies with equal force to
Rule 13204(a)(4) with respect to broker-dealer/employment agreements.
Rules 13204 and 12204 share the same history. In both the 1992 and 1994
approval orders for the relevant rules, the SEC emphasized that these rules
promote the important interest that “access to the courts for class action
litigation should be preserved.”75
In addition, the Cohen and Laver courts incorrectly ruled that there is no
conflict between Rule 13204 and FAA section 2. In particular, both courts
erred when they treated the agreement to arbitrate as “conceptually distinct”
from the class waiver.76 First, if the two provisions are distinct, then one is
certainly not an agreement to arbitrate and thus not covered by FAA section
2. Second, and importantly, the Supreme Court in Italian Colors said an
agreement to arbitrate and a class action waiver should be read together as
part of one agreement.77 When read together as one agreement, Rule 13204
does conflict with FAA section 2, because enforcing one necessarily requires
ignoring the other. If the agreement including the class waiver is enforceable
as written, a broker-dealer employee would not be able to invoke FINRA
74

Schwab, 2014 WL 1665738 at *8 (first emphasis original; second emphasis added).

75

SEC Order re Exclusion of Class Actions from Arbitration, 57 Fed. Reg. 52659-02, at
52661; SEC Order re Exclusion of Class Action Claims from Arbitration, 59 Fed. Reg.
22032-01, at 22033. As the court in Cohen noted, the FINRA Board of Governors in Schwab
also mentioned three district court cases that had been cited by Schwab there, each of which
had found class waivers enforceable in the context of employment claims. FINRA stated
that these cases were not “controlling over disputes with customers.” However, contrary to
what the Second Circuit seems to have implied in Cohen, FINRA did not say either way in
Schwab, neither did it have opportunity to decide, whether those district court cases were
correctly decided or consistent with FINRA Rule 13204(a)(4). Schwab, 2014 WL 1665738,
at *7-8.
76
Cohen, 799 F.3d at 179-80; Laver, 976 F.3d at 847.
77

See supra note 8.
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Rule 13204 which bars FINRA member firms from enforcing clauses in
arbitration agreements that purport to waive their associated persons’ rights
to pursue class claims in court.
B. Rule 13204 is a “Congressional Command”
In addition, Rule 13204 is a “command” of Congress sufficient to
displace the FAA. In Cohen and Laver, the Second and Ninth Circuits did not
reach the issue of whether a FINRA rule could displace another Act of
Congress. The few lower courts to consider it have divided on the question.78
First, it is indisputable that FINRA member firms must abide by all
FINRA rules, including the Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry
Disputes.79 Furthermore, FINRA Rules “approved by the SEC are
expressions of federal legislative power.”80 Therefore, Rule 13204 has the
force of federal law, i.e. ’34 Act, under Exchange Act §15A.81
Second, an administrative agency pronouncement can be a “command”
for purposes of the implied repeal doctrine. The Supreme Court itself cited a
Congressional delegation of authority to an administrative agency to regulate
arbitration—precisely what we have here—as an example of a “contrary

78

Compare Singh v. Interactive Brokers LLC, 2016 WL 7007791 (E.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2016)
(holding that arbitration rules of FINRA are not contrary “Congressional” commands), with
Dep't of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Complaint No. 2011029760201, 2014
WL 1665738 (FINRA Apr. 24, 2014) (reasoning that, because the Exchange Act delegated
to the SEC, which in turn delegated to FINRA, the authority to regulate broker-dealers’
arbitration agreements for the protection of investors, the Exchange Act, through FINRA
Rule 12204, constituted a sufficient Congressional command to overcome the FAA's
mandate).
See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Tracy, 812 F.3d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Nor is
there any dispute that, as a member of FINRA, Credit Suisse is bound to follow FINRA's
arbitration rules. Arbitration rules, as we have previously concluded, bind FINRA members.
. .”); Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87, 93 (3d Cir. 2018) (same).
80
Charles Schwab & Co. Inc. v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1063,
1065 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citations omitted) (“Because of the SEC's
oversight, FINRA Rules approved by the SEC are expressions of federal legislative power
and have the force and effect of a federal regulation.”).
79

See McDaniel v. Wells Fargo Invs., LLC, 717 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Congress has
vested [FINRA] and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) with the power to promulgate
rules that, once adopted by the SEC, have the force of law”); Credit Suisse First Boston
Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1132 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding SRO arbitration rules
approved by the SEC are “laws of the United States” and stating that they preempt conflicting
state law).
81
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congressional command” for purposes of supplanting the FAA.82 In
CompuCredit, when rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that the Credit Repair
Organizations Act (CROA)—which made no mention of arbitration—
superseded the FAA, the Court stated:
Had Congress meant to prohibit these very common
provisions [pre-dispute arbitration clauses] in the CROA, it
would have done so in a manner less obtuse than what
respondents suggest. When it has restricted the use of
arbitration in other contexts, it has done so with a clarity that
far exceeds the claimed indications in the CROA.83
The Court then cited examples of statutes where Congress did speak with
the requisite clarity. Included in those examples (with a cf. signal) was 12
U.S.C. § 5518(b), the very statute that grants authority to the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) to regulate predispute arbitration
agreements in contracts for consumer financial products or services.84
Notably, that statute does not directly prohibit arbitration agreements or class
waivers, it just empowers another governmental body to apply its own
expertise to regulate arbitration as it sees fit. Thus, the Supreme Court pointed
to a general Congressional delegation of authority to an administrative
agency (there, the CFPB) to regulate arbitration in an industry (there,
consumer financial services) in which the agency has special expertise, as a
type of “congressional command” that could displace the FAA.85
Congress has delegated to the SEC the authority to approve, amend or
abrogate any rule of any securities self-regulatory organization (“SRO”),
including FINRA.86 In addition, the delegation of authority explicitly covers
activities of associated persons, not just activities of investors or customers.87
82

See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 104 (2012).

83

Id. at 103.

84

Id. at 104.
This does not mean that courts must accord formal deference to the SEC’s interpretation
of FINRA’s rules, but courts should take into account that interpretation.
85

86

See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233-34 (1987)
(discussing Congress’ broad delegation to the SEC of “expansive power to ensure the
adequacy of the arbitration procedures employed by the SROs”).
See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Tracy, 812 F.3d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 2016) (“FINRA is
an independent organization authorized by Congress to regulate the U.S. securities markets
and professionals who sell securities in the United States”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8)
87
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The Supreme Court has long recognized that the 1975 amendments to the
Exchange Act have multiple policy purposes, as they “authorize [FINRA] to
promulgate rules designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative practices;
to promote equitable principles of trade; to safeguard against unreasonable
profits and charges; and generally to protect investors and the public
interest.”88 Providing and regulating a forum for arbitration of industry
disputes is just one way to achieve these broad Congressional goals.
When approving FINRA Rule 13204, the SEC was implementing its
Congressionally-delegated authority. And unlike in Epic Systems where the
NLRA does not use term “class action,” Rule 13204 explicitly addresses class
actions. Thus, Rule 13204 is a Congressional command within the meaning
of CompuCredit that supplants the FAA’s general command to enforce
arbitration agreements as written.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court no doubt enforces arbitration agreements under
the FAA. In the last decade, the Court has extended that enforcement to class
action waivers that are coupled with arbitration agreements. And, the
Supreme Court has not met a class action waiver it has not liked.
Whether the Court will like a class action waiver in a broker-dealer’s
agreement with its employees remains to be seen. Congress has delegated
regulation of the securities industry to the SEC, which as a matter of policy
has decided that class actions belong in court, not in arbitration. And, the SEC
approved arbitration rules to ensure that investors and employees of brokerdealers retain the ability to pursue their class claims in court.
A class action waiver, in essence, nullifies Rule 13204 entirely. To
ignore Rule 13204’s prohibition of class action waivers would be to nullify
the very regulation that the SEC approved. A FINRA member firm can evade
the prohibition in Rule 13204(a)(4) by simply inserting a class action waiver
in its standard arbitration agreement with employees. Just as Schwab’s effort
to insert a class action waiver in customer agreements was shut down by
FINRA in 2014, broker-dealers’ insertion of class action waivers in
employment agreements should similary be shut down.

(reflecting Congressional creation of a national securities association and regulations of
persons associated with such association); 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g) (specifying the laws
empowering the SEC to approve SRO rules includes rules governing persons associated with
a member firm).
88

United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 700 n. 6 (1975) (internal
citations omitted).
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Permitting broker-dealers to evade the SEC’s regulations could lead
to broader noncompliance in other areas of the securities laws. Congress
created the SEC to be the expert regulator in the securities industry, and that
agency has done so effectively for almost one hundred years. To eviscerate
its powers now would cause disruption in the securities markets, hurt
securities industry employees, and ultimately harm investors.
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